This paper examines the effect of leasing of property, plant and equipment on investment expenditure by non-financial Standard & Poor's (S&P) 100, S&P 400 and S&P 600 lessee firms over the period of [1995][1996][1997][1998][1999][2000][2001][2002][2003][2004][2005][2006]. I find that leasing mitigates underinvestment problem by positively enabling capital expenditures and reducing the sensitivity of investment expenditures to availability of internal funds in sample firms. The results are robust to several alternative measurements of the key variables and different regression specifications and estimation techniques. Consistent with theory, lessee firms with higher information asymmetry rely on more lease financing. However, the evidence on agency costs is mixed. Consistent with past studies, leasing by lessee corporations is significantly positively correlated with firm size, tax loss carry forwards and significantly negatively correlated to profitability margin and average tax rate.
general, there are tax differences among the lessor and lessee corporations where lessors have comparative advantage in using tax deductions and in obtaining financial capital. Further, lessors typically have comparative advantage in bearing the risks of ownership and disposal/resale/re-lease of the leased assets.
Hence the leasing versus buying of property, plant and equipment will not be irrelevant if the lessor has market power or if taxes, contracting costs, and production/investment incentives are affected by the choice between buying and leasing. As noted by Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) , Ezzell and Vora (2001) the lease financing can increase firm value if it lowers taxes, reduces contracting costs, or improves investment policy. Stulz and Johnson (1985) further argue that the non-cancellable long-term leases should also help mitigate the underinvestment problem due to debt overhang identified by Myers (1977) . The underinvestment problem is mitigated because of the senior legal standing of leases to all outstanding fixed claims. By segregating the claim on new project's cash flows, leasing, unlike risky debt, limits the wealth transfer from stockholders to existing bondholders. This helps lessee firms undertake some positive NPV projects which are otherwise foregone with risky/unsecured debt financing.
Following the seminal articles by Johnson and Lewellen (1972) , Miller and Upton (1976) , Lewellen, Long and McConnell (1976) , Myers, Dill and Bautista (1976) , Long (1977) , Ang and Peterson (1984) and Smith and Wakeman (1985) the past empirical literature on leasing examines the role of taxes, bankruptcy, CEO ownership, and financial contracting costs due to market imperfections such as information asymmetry and agency on lease/buy decisions and the substitutability of lease and debt financing i.e. the lease/borrow decision. For example the role of taxes in the lease versus borrow decision is explored by Graham, Lemmon and Schallheim (1998) for US firms and by Adedeji and Stapleton (1996) for UK based firms. Similarly, the role of bankruptcy costs on the lease/borrow decision is examined by Krishnan and Moyer (1994) . Mehran, Taggart and Yermack (1999) investigate empirically the role of CEO stock ownership on lease versus debt financing and report a positive relation between the ownership and leasing. Recently, Robicheaux, Fu and Ligon (2008) examine whether firms, that use lease financing to control the agency cost of debt, use leasing as a substitute or complement to mechanisms such as managerial incentive compensation and corporate governance used to control the agency costs of equity. Robicheaux et al.(2008) offer empirical evidence that firms with higher CEO stock ownership and option compensation use more lease financing. They further document that firms with smaller boards and boards with more outside directors tend to use more lease financing. Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) examine the role of financial contracting costs on the propensity to lease and find that leasing reduces costs of external financing due to asymmetric information. Ezzell and Vora (2001) also find that leasing reduces external financing costs. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) and Hubbard (1998) investigate the role of capital market imperfections on investment expenditures by firms and find that investments are significantly and positively related to internal cash flow 1 . However, past empirical work on leasing, as mentioned above, largely ignores the impact of leasing on corporate investment expenditures despite the fact that leased equipment currently accounts for about one third of all capital equipment investment.
Hence, I intend to contribute to the finance literature by integrating the existing literature on leasing as well as financial constraints. In this paper, for the first time to the best of my knowledge, I examine the role of leasing on increasing investment expenditure and decreasing the investment-cash flow sensitivity of lessee corporations. Sharpe and Nguyen(1995) and Ezzell and Vora(2001) use dividend dummy as a measure of asymmetric information i.e. they classify firms that do not pay a dividend as high information asymmetry firms and that pay a dividend as low information asymmetry firms. However, the decision to pay a dividend or not is endogenous to a firm 2 . Hence, as another contribution to the existing empirical literature on leasing, I use more direct and less noisy market microstructure based proxies viz. stock illiquidity and bid-1 Please note that Fazzari et al. (1988) infer investment -cash flow (Inv-CF) sensitivity as a proxy for financial constraints. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) take an exception to this and argue that investment-cash flow sensitivities are not useful measures of financial constraints. There is considerable debate in literature on this issue and the evidence is mixed. Moyen (2004) tries to reconcile the differences in literature and offers evidence that is consistent with both FHP and KZ. However, in this study, my objective is not to use Inv-CF sensitivity to identify the financial constraints but examine the effect of leasing on Inv-CF sensitivity.
ask spread as proxies for information asymmetry 3 . Further, I use market based measures such as credit rating to proxy agency costs between bondholders and shareholders 4 .
I find that leasing mitigates underinvestment problem by positively enabling capital expenditures and reducing the sensitivity of investment expenditures to availability of internal funds of sample firms. The results are robust to several alternative measurements of key variables and different regression specifications and estimation techniques. Consistent with past studies on investment expenditures, I find that capital expenditures are significantly positively related to internal cash-flow and Tobin's Q. Consistent with theory, lessee firms with higher information asymmetry employ more leasing. However, the evidence on agency costs is mixed. Lease financing by lessee corporations is significantly positively correlated with firm size, tax loss carry forwards and significantly negatively correlated to profitability margin and average tax rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section-I reviews the literature and develops testable hypotheses on the determinants of leasing and the effect of leasing on firm investment expenditures and investment-cash flow sensitivity for a sample of non-financial US firms. Section-II deals with data collection, variable measurement. Section-III covers empirical modeling, estimation and results. Section-IV offers robustness checks. Section-V concludes.
I. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development:
Theories of Leasing
There are several well explained motivations for firms to engage in leasing. The theory and corresponding empirical work are reviewed, briefly, below 5 :
A. Agency Costs Agency conflicts can arise between bondholders and shareholders and/or between managers and shareholders and can lead to asset substitution and underinvestment. Smith and Warner (1979) argue that long-term non-cancellable leases i.e. strict financial or capital leases can help mitigate the asset substitution problem because the non-cancellable lease commits the lessee to use the leased asset over the life of the lease contract. The argument here is that in case of leasing the lessee gets the leased asset, a capital good, but not cash thus mitigating the risk of asset substitution.
In the presence of risky debt in the firm's capital structure, equityholders may underinvest by giving up positive NPV investments because the project's benefits accrue to the existing debtholders and the existing debt load makes it too costly for the firm to borrow in external capital markets. This creates the underinvestment problem due to debt overhang as identified in Myers (1977) . Stulz and Johnson (1985) argue that the non-cancellable long-term leases should help mitigate the underinvestment problem due to debt overhang. However, in case of short term operational leases, agency costs may also arise between lessor and lessee due to the separation of ownership from usage of asset. Since the lessees have no right to the residual value of the asset, they have no incentive to take proper care of it. This is the reason why corporations lease office facilities much more frequently than manufacturing or R&D facilities. Please see Smith and Wakeman (1985) for more details. While secured debt can mitigate some of the agency costs associated with leasing by eliminating the separation of ownership and control, it has been widely argued in the finance literature that debt can also introduce agency problems and lead to bondholder vs. shareholder conflicts resulting in asset substitution, risk shifting and underinvestment. All these are the agency costs due to external debt.
Past leasing literature argues that leasing has all the advantages as that of secured debt and some.
However, this may not be entirely true as leasing introduces the separation of ownership and control which is completely avoided by secured debt. But, lessors also get some benefits viz. sharing some of the tax benefits in case of capital leases and fully capturing the same in case of operating leases. Lessors can also obtain nontax related advantages such as depreciation tax shields in case of operating leases. Further the agency problem between lessees and lessors can be mitigated by including a buy-back option. Also, in case of distress the lessor can easily repossess the leased asset unlike a secured lender. In the end, lessors do recognize these benefits and costs and accordingly factor them in calculating the lease payments. Robicheaux, Fu, and Ligon (2008) examine whether lease financing, used to control the agency costs of debt, is used as a substitute or complement to mechanisms such as corporate governance, managerial incentive compensation used to control agency costs of equity. They find leasing is complementary to governance and incentive compensation suggesting that firms try to control simultaneously the agency costs of debt as well as external equity.
B. Information Asymmetry
The existence of information asymmetry between managers and investors regarding ongoing operations i.e.
assets-in-place or future firm prospects can lead to both adverse selection and moral hazard costs. Myers and Majluf (1984) demonstrate that if managers can issue safe debt, the adverse selection problem due to information asymmetry could be reduced. 6 A pecking order of capital structure arise in their model, where retained earnings followed by safe debt, risky debt and as a last resort equity are used in that order to finance 6 Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that asymmetric information in debt markets can also cause distortions similar to those for new common share issues. Asymmetric information may increase the cost of new debt, or even result in credit rationing. In the extreme, a "financial collapse" may occur, in which some or all classes of asymmetric-information borrowers are denied loans as seen in the 2007-08 global financial meltdown.
the operations. Consistent with Myers and Majluf(1984) one can argue that leasing, being similar to secured debt, should also mitigate the adverse selection problem 7 . Gilligan (2004) argues that leasing may reduce adverse selection in durable goods markets by increasing the average quality of used goods offered for sale. Johnson and Waldman (2003) argue that the main return to leasing is the reduction in adverse-selection problem in the used-car market. Hendel and Lizzeri (2002) explore the important link between adverse selection and leasing and argue that adverse selection may account for the higher turnover and slower price declines of off-lease vehicles relative to purchased vehicles.
For a comprehensive examination of the role of leasing in mitigating the adverse selection costs in durable goods markets viz. used cars, and used aircrafts please refer Hendel and Lizzeri (2002) , Johnson and Waldman (2003) , and Gilligan (2004) respectively. All these studies conclude that in case of durable goods markets leasing mitigates the adverse selection costs due to information asymmetry about the quality of the used good identified by the pioneering study of Akerlof (1970) .
Based on the 'financial contracting' motivations suggested by Smith and Wakeman (1985) , the role of leasing in alleviating financial contracting costs is explored by Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) . They argue that financing with a lease may reduce the cost of external funds that arise due to asymmetric information or from agency problems that give rise to costly monitoring as per Smith and Warner (1979) . By financing via true lease the firm puts the lease obligation on par with other administrative expenses that have higher priority than normal debt. This makes leasing a highly desirable financial contract in the presence asymmetric information as it puts leasing at the top of the pecking order of external financing options. Ezzell and Vora (2001) offer further empirical support for the argument that leasing reduces external financing costs related to adverse selection arising from asymmetric information.
7 There is a considerable debate in literature whether debt and lease substitute or complement one another. Bowman (1980), Ang and Peterson (1984) , Moral hazard problem arises because the salvage value of the leased asset accrues to the lessor 8 . This leaves the lessee with little or no incentive to maintain the asset in order to preserve its salvage value. Ezzell and Vora (2001) provide empirical evidence that the benefits from leasing are lower for assets whose salvage value is more sensitive to usage and maintenance. However, lessors do recognize these issues and include various provisions in the lease contract such as penalty clauses, metered lease payments to reduce abuse of the leased asset. Chau, Firth and Srinidhi (2006) argue that leases with a purchase option can completely mitigate the moral hazard problem. Moral hazard is also applicable to durable goods that are purchases when new because the maintenance expenditures are not reflected in the price of used units on the secondhand market. As a result, for example in the automobile market moral hazard can be more severe for cars purchased rather than leased when new. Desai and Purohit (1999) provide evidence that used cars that were leased when new sell for more than used cars that were purchased when new.
Based on the above arguments, I posit the following hypotheses on leasing, information and agency frictions:
H1a: Lessee firms with higher information frictions should lease more H1b: Lessee firms with higher agency frictions should lease more
These follow directly from the theoretical arguments discussed above that leases help mitigate the asset substitution problem due to agency and costly external financing due to information asymmetry.
C. Tax Incentives Tax related incentives to leasing are one of the earliest and widely examined in the lease versus buy decisions and focus on the differential tax position of the lessee and lessor as the primary rationale for leasing. Leasing models generally predict that firms with relatively low marginal tax rates employ more leasing than firms with high marginal tax rates. Miller and Upton (1976), Myers, Dill and Bautista (1976) , Lewellen, Long, and McConnell (1976) , Smith and Wakeman (1985) , and Brick, Fung, and Subrahmanyam (1987) provide the intuition that leases allow the transfer of tax shields from lessee firms that cannot fully utilize the tax deduction of lease payments to lessor firms. In a comprehensive study Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim (1998) provide empirical evidence-on the link between leasing and taxes, consistent with theory 9 . Graham et al. (1998) argue that the corporate tax status is endogenous to financing decisions. Hence, using a forward-looking estimate of before-financing corporate marginal tax rates they document a negative relation between operating leases and tax rates for lessees.
D. Financial Distress
Following Leeth and Scott (1989), and Scott (1977) one can argue that lease contracts have lower expected costs for the lessor in case of bankruptcy of lessee than secured debt has for the lender, thereby making leasing a preferred financing choice for firms with higher expected bankruptcy costs. Further, prior to bankruptcy, lessors enjoy a superior claim over secured lenders. For example, if a lessee defaults on the terms of the lease the lessor can seize the leased asset with minimum legal costs avoiding any losses and delays that may arise from bankruptcy and reorganization process. By explicitly recognizing the role of bankruptcy costs Krishnan and Moyer (1994) offer empirical evidence that leasing has lower associated bankruptcy costs relative to secured debt and thus a preferred financing choice for firms with higher probability of financial distress or bankruptcy. Krishnan and Moyer (1994) argue that in general lease contracts are more complex compared to secured debt contracts 10 . Thus there is a trade-off between the potential benefits and the contracting costs of leasing. However, as the cost of bankruptcy increases, leasing becomes an attractive financing option in the pecking order, ceteris paribus 11 . Most recently, Eisfeldt and Rampini (2008) argue that leased capital has more debt capacity than debt capital because of the ability to repossess the leased asset is high compared to that of secured debt in case of financial distress of the lessee 9 Accounting treatment of leases classifies all leases into either capital or operating leases. However, the tax based classification of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) classifies leases into true leases or non-true leases/ conditional sale contracts. As per Graham et al. (1998) operating leases are more likely to qualify as true leases than capital leases under IRS guidelines. They argue that only true leases allow transfer of non-debt tax shields such as investment tax credits, and depreciation tax shields etc. from lessee to lessor and that considering only capitalized leases may miss the true effect of tax status on leasing.
firm. Hence lessors may be willing to provide more lease capital than the debt capital provided by secured lenders.
E. Managerial Risk Aversion
Managers are usually less diversified than regular shareholders because managers have their human capital and current and future compensation tied to the firm's performance or value. Flath (1980) and Smith and Wakeman(1985) argue that the ownership structure should affect the decision to lease assets. This literature predicts that higher levels of managerial ownership should be associated with higher levels of lease financing. Flath (1980) argues that in closely held lessee firms leasing is more likely as the ownership of capital assets makes reduction of risk through diversification more difficult and leasing mitigates this concern by allocating usage rights of the underlying asset to the lessee while leaving ownership rights with the lessor. Leasing reduces the concentration of wealth and facilitates more efficient allocation of riskbearing by shifting ownership risk from risk-averse lessees to less risk-averse lessors. Mehran, Taggart, and Yermack (1999) provide empirical evidence that CEO stock ownership, proxied by the fraction of common shares owned by firm's CEO, has significant positive effect on lease financing. Mehran et al.(1999) argue that when CEOs have larger ownership stakes, their interests are more closely aligned with shareholders and also have more control over the firm. Thus, CEOs with large equity ownership use more leasing in order to reduce exposure to technological obsolescence and other asset-specific risks 12 . Also, as per Smith and Wakeman(1985) , in addition to managerial stock ownership, managerial incentive compensation can affect the incentives to lease. For example, a manager whose bonus depends on the return on invested capital could argue in favor of leasing rather than purchasing property, plant and equipment as the denominator in the performance measure could increase drastically with purchasing. 13 Robicheaux, Fu, and Ligon (2008) offer empirical evidence that firms with higher CEO stock ownership and option compensation use more lease financing.
12 The argument here is that lessors typically have a comparative advantage, compared to lessees, in bearing the costs of obsolescence and reselling/re-leasing of the used durable goods. 13 For capital leases this incentive could be controlled by including the capitalized value of lease payments in the calculation of invested capital.
Lease financing and Investment
Following the seminal papers of Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) , and Fazzari et al. (1988) , there has been extensive literature on the cash flow constraints and investment Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Moyen (2004) . Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) find that positive relation between changes in yearly capital expenditures and changes in annual cash flows is stronger for firms facing financial constraints stemming from capital market imperfections. As noted by Sharpe and Ngyuen (1995) , despite the fact that leased equipment accounts for roughly a third of all equipment investment by corporations, the effect of leasing on firm's investment expenditures is virtually ignored 14 . Also, for some firms such as small and young firms, firms with no credit rating, financially constrained/distressed firms leasing may be the only option. Further, the top reason for leasing is the consistent expenses in capital budget planning. Leasing offers flexible terms and customized options that take into account the needs of cash flow, budget, seasonal fluctuations and transaction structure 15 .
In the presence of risky debt in the firm's capital structure, equityholders may underinvest by giving up positive NPV investments because the project's benefits accrue to the existing debtholders and the existing debt load makes it too costly for the firm to borrow in external capital markets. This creates the underinvestment problem due to debt overhang as identified in Myers (1977) . Thus the firm's borrowing/debt capacity and the availability of internal funds are important determinants of its investment decisions. Stulz and Johnson (1985) argue that the non-cancellable leases should help mitigate the underinvestment problem due to debt overhang. The underinvestment problem is mitigated because of the senior legal standing of leases to all outstanding fixed claims. Most recently, Eisfeldt and Rampini (2008) argue that leased capital has more debt capacity than debt capital because of the ability to repossess the leased asset is high compared to that of secured debt in case of financial distress of the lessee firm. Hence lessors may be willing to provide more lease capital than the debt capital provided by secured lenders. Also, if lease financing improves the debt capacity and/or decreases the distress/bankruptcy costs associated with debt overhang then it should mitigate the underinvestment problem. This helps firms undertake some positive NPV projects which are otherwise foregone with risky/unsecured debt financing.
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2008) This follows directly from the argument that leasing mitigates the underinvestment problem due to debt overhang and reduces the costs of financial distress.
H3: Leasing reduces the sensitivity of investment expenditure to internal funds of lessee firms.
This follows from the argument that leasing reduces the cost of external capital due to capital market frictions, decreases the costs of financial distress and better aligns the financing and investment activities.
H4: Leasing increases the sensitivity of investment expenditure to the investment opportunities (Q) of lessee firms.
As per Froot et al. (1993) , it is not just the availability of investment opportunities but the inability to undertake them i.e. financial constraints is the source of dead weight costs associated with underinvestment.
By mitigating the costs due to underinvestment and financial distress leasing allows firms that have higher investment opportunities to invest more. I use Tobin's Q as a proxy for the firm's growth opportunities. There are several ways to measure Q and most empirical studies measure the average Q whereas what one really needs to measure is a marginal Q.
II. Data Collection and Variables Measurement
There is a considerable debate on whether Q as measured conventionally is indeed a good measure of growth opportunities. As per Harvey, Lins and Roper (2004) , I use the ratio of market to book value of total assets as 18 Alternatively, I use EBITDA (Data 13) as measure of cash flow.
19 Firm managers constitute a subset of the informed traders who in turn are a subset of all traders (both informed and uniformed) in the market.
Further, they note that the market microstructure measures of information asymmetry are proxies for this adverse selection, albeit imperfect ones since they also encompass informed traders who are not firm managers. Nonetheless, these proxies capture the financial markets' perception of the information advantage held by firm insiders and the resulting adverse selection costs, which are what ultimately affects the cost of issuing information-sensitive securities.
where Diy is the number of days for which data are available for stock i in year y. Riyd is the return on stock i on day d of year y and VOLDiyd is the respective daily dollar volume. The stock price changes without trading when investors agree about the implication of news, while disagreement induces increase in trading volume. Thus, Amihud (2002) argues that ILLIQ can be interpreted as a measure of consensus belief among investors about new information. However, please note that at any point in time, stock liquidity is very likely to be driven by adverse selection but not exclusively so because of inventory and order processing costs. Hence, as a robustness check, I use yearly average of daily closing bid-ask spread from CRSP as an alternative measure for information asymmetry. I also report similar statistics for industry categories based on two-digit SIC codes. The median firm in the wholesale industry appears to be most illiquid whereas the median public administration firm seems to be least illiquid among all the industry categories. Further the median firm in retail appears to deploy more leased assets relative to net PPE whereas a median firm in transportation seems to employ less leased assets.
Please refer to Table- II for the details.
The pairwise correlations among the key variables are reported in Table-III 
III. Empirical Models, Estimation and Results

Information Asymmetry, Agency frictions and Leasing
As suggested by the extant literature on the determinants of leasing and reviewed in section 1.1 above, I
control for tax savings as proxied by large and small tax-loss carry forward(L/STLCF) dummies [Sharpe et al. (1995) ] 27 , Tax rate proxied by tax expense(data 16) divided by pretax income(data 170) [Sharpe et al., Ezzell and Vora], financial distress/bankruptcy proxied by modified Altman Z score [Krishnan and Moyer(1993) , Graham et al.(1998)] 28 , investment/growth opportunities as proxied by Market to Book ratio of assets [Graham et al.] , profit margin(PM) proxied by the ratio EBIT to Sales [Sharpe et al., Robicheaux et al.] , and firm size proxied by log(Sales) [Sharpe et al., Robicheaux et al., Mehran et al.] . In the comprehensive leasing model, presented below, information asymmetry (IA) and Agency Cost (AC) frictions are the hypothesized/test variables.
27 LTLCF is equal to one if firm has a positive tax-loss-carry-forward (Data 52) exceeding current year EBITDA. Past empirical work also defines STLCF is equal to one if firm has a positive tax-loss-carry-forward not exceeding current year EBITDA. But in regressions with a constant term one cannot use both the dummies as it leads to the dummy variable trap. 28 Modified/unlevered Altman's Z index is computed as per [Frank and Goyal (2003) , Acharya et al.(2007) , Graham et al. (1998) Table-IV and a brief discussion follows:
The coefficient on agency costs is negative as expected in Tobit regressions but positive in OLS regressions 30 . The coefficient on information asymmetry, proxied by illiquidity and also bid-ask spread, is positive and conforms to both the pecking order theory and contracting costs arguments that firms with higher information asymmetry should lease more. The coefficient on LTLCF is positive because firms with significant tax-loss carry forwards will be unable to take full advantage of tax benefits of asset ownership, hence they should lease more. The coefficient on tax rate is negative as expected but the significance varied based on the model. The coefficient on size is positive and size squared is negative indicating that largest firms use less lease financing consistent with expectations. As expected, the coefficient on Q is positive as higher growth firms should lease more. The coefficient on fixed assets ratio (FAR) is negative as expected.
As per accounting identity, if most leasing is in the form of operating leases, any operating lease is taking the place of what would otherwise be a fixed asset, implying the negative relation between the two. Also, high fixed asset ratio means higher tangible assets that can serve as collateral for debt financing and hence lower need for lease financing. Finally, the coefficient on profitability margin (PM) is negative as expected. This is intuitive as firms with high profitability may buy rather than lease their fixed assets.
Leasing and Investment
I use the following model to test the hypotheses developed in the section 1.2 above:
29 The Tobit estimates are obtained by maximizing the unconditional log likelihood function. Please note that it is not possible to use conditional maximum likelihood procedure to consistently estimate a fixed effects Tobit model for a fixed T because no sufficient statistic exists for unobserved individual firm heterogeneity. 30 Please note that the proxy used for agency costs is negatively correlated to agency problems.
This model is pretty standard in the investment-cash flow constraints literature (Fazzari et al., Moyen) 31 . The above equation is estimated using fixed effects regression. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. Further, I also correct for clustering of residuals around industry groups based on twodigit SIC codes. 32 The results are reported in Table-IV and discussed below: Consistent with past empirical evidence, I find the coefficients on Q and CF/K both positive and highly significant 33 . The coefficient on OLR is positive as expected and also significant thus lending support to hypothesis-H2. So, leasing facilitates better coordination of investment and financing activities and reduces underinvestment costs. Hence firms that lease more should invest more in order to mitigate the underinvestment costs mentioned above. I also find the interaction term CF/K*OLR is negative and significant 34 . This supports the hypothesis-H3 that effective leasing should reduce the sensitivity of investments to internal cash flow because leasing reduces the cost of external capital due to capital market frictions and better aligns the financing and investment activities i.e. improves investment efficiency. Finally the interaction term Q*OLR is positive and significant as predicted. This supports the hypothesis -H4 that firms with higher investment opportunities suffer the most from the underinvestment costs and hence should invest more. The coefficient on Z and Size are not as predicted but not significant 35 .
31 Please note that both Fazzari et al.(1988 ) , and Moyen ( 2004) do not use all the variables used in the above model as the focus their study was not leasing. 33 It is well recognized in literature that what needs to be measured is marginal Q and not average Q. The inherent problems in measuring Tobin's Q and the inadequacy of Q for controlling the investment opportunities may drive the positive relation between Inv-CF. Hence, I also estimated, in unreported results, using the ratio of R&D plus advertising expenses to sales as an alternative measure of investment opportunities and the results do not change qualitatively.
34 The investment-cash flow regression results for industry groups based on 2-digit SIC codes are available from the authors.
35 The coefficient on Size is significant in regression 4. Hence, in an unreported analysis, I further investigated this using Size 2 . I find that size is significantly negative and squared size is significantly positive. This suggests that larger firms invest more and as expected. 
IV. Robustness Checks
Leasing and Investment
Change Regressions
I exploit the panel structure of the data and reestimate equation (2) using the change in levels by first differencing the data. This serves as a useful check against potential autocorrelation in the data. The change regression also mitigates endogeneity due to omitted variables more effectively as it removes firm-specific unobservable heterogeneity that could be correlated with leasing and investment at any given time. The estimation is carried out using ordinary least squares. The results are reported in Table-VI and briefly discussed here.
The change regressions using overall sample also support hypothesis H2, H3 and H4. Also, unlike with the levels, the coefficients on Size and Z have expected signs and are significant too. However, the sign on ∆Q changed to negative. The effect of positive and negative cash flow changes may be different on the capital expenditures. Hence, I exploit the panel structure of the data and split the sample to reflect positive and negative changes in CF/K. I reestimate the investment-cash flow equation for both the subsamples. Please refer to Table-VI for further details. 36 Wooldridge (2002) argues that in applied econometrics, endogeneity usually arises in three ways viz. omitted variables, measurement error, and simultaneity. He mentions that the distinctions among the three forms are not always sharp and an equation can in fact have more than one source of endogeneity at any given point in time. The use of lagged dependent variables in dynamic models could be yet another source of endogeneity.
Insrumental Variable Regressions
As another robustness check, I estimate equation (2) again using instrumental variable approach. I use large tax loss carry forward (LTLCF) and fixed asset ratio (FAR) as instruments for operating lease ratio 37 . The estimation is carried out using two-step generalized method of moments (GMM). This estimator also produces both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) consistent estimates of both the slope coefficients and the corresponding standard errors. Only the second stage regression results are reported in Table- VII for brevity and briefly discussed here. The sign on predicted OLR1 is positive as expected but it is not significant. The coefficients on CF/K*OLR1 and Q*OLR1 have expected signs and also significant thus supporting the hypotheses H3 and H4 respectively. Also the specification tests as reported by Hansen J statistic and the corresponding p-values allay the concern regarding misspecification of the model at 5% and 1% level.
Simultaneous Equation Modeling
Finance theory argues that financing and investment decisions are jointly made i.e. codetermined. To address the simultaneity issue of capital expenditure and leasing in equation-2, I model the investment and leasing decisions as a simultaneous equation system and use three-stage least squares (3SLS) as estimation technique 38 . In the absence of any clear structural models that address this simultaneity issue in the past finance literature, I posit the following specification:
37 Fixed Asset Ratio is measured as a ratio of netPPE toTotal Assets. There are no clear guidelines as to what should be the relevant instruments for leasing. I select the above two based on both the past studies on determinants of leasing as well as the pair-wise correlation of these two variables with leasing in the data sample used in this study. I further check the validity of these instruments based on the specification test of the model using Hansen's J statistic for overidentification of all the instruments.
38 I also estimated the above system of equations one-at-a-time using 2SLS. Also, this approach offers the advantage that misspecification of any one equation in the system is not propagated throughout the entire system. The qualitative results are not much different and available upon request. However, it defeats the purpose of joint estimation of the entire system due to simultaneity and also the estimators are not as efficient as those of 3SLS.
Only the last stage results are reported in Table- VIII for brevity and briefly discussed here. In the investment equation, the coefficient on predicted operating lease ratio (OLR) is positive as expected and also significant supporting hypothesis H2. The coefficient on CF/K*OLR is negative and significant lending credence to hypothesis H3. In the leasing equation the coefficient on information asymmetry (IA) is positive as expected and also significant supporting H1a. However, the coefficient on agency costs (AC) is negative as expected but not significant.
High Vs. Low Information Asymmetry
If leasing is useful not only as a source of capital but also effective as a mechanism to mitigate the agency costs of underinvestment or costly external financing due to information asymmetry, then I expect to see stronger association between investment and leasing for firms with high information asymmetry. Further, the sensitivity of investment to internal cash-flow should be reduced more for high information asymmetry firms compared with low information asymmetry firms. To test these I sort firms from low to high information asymmetry based on the Amihud (2002) liquidity measure and then reestimate the equation 2. The results for the overall sample and for the lower quintile and upper quintile sample splits are reported in Table-IX and briefly discussed here.
The coefficient on OLR is positive and highly significant in both the overall sample and lower and upper quintiles lending support to the hypothesis H2 that leasing positively enables the investment expenditure of lessee firms. Also, as expected, the coefficient on lease ratio (OLR) is much stronger, almost double, and significant for the high information asymmetry (Quintile-5) firms compared to low information asymmetry firms (Quintile-1). Further, the coefficient on the interaction term CF/K*OLR is still negative and significant in both the overall sample and lower and upper quintiles lending credence to the hypothesis H3 that leasing reduces the sensitivity of capital expenditures to internal funds.
V. Conclusions
Using a broad based sample of S&P 100, S&P 400 and S&P 600 non financial firms for the period of 1995-2006, I study the effect of leasing on corporate investment and investment-cash flow sensitivity. I find that leasing mitigates underinvestment problem by positively enabling capital expenditures and reducing the sensitivity of investment expenditures to availability of internal funds of sample firms. The results are pretty robust to several alternative measurements of key variables and different regression specifications and estimation techniques. Using market microstructure based measures of information frictions, I further offer empirical evidence consistent with theory that lessee firms with higher information asymmetry employ more leasing. However, the evidence on agency costs is mixed. Consistent with past empirical studies, leasing by lessee corporations is significantly positively correlated with firm size, tax loss carry forwards and significantly negatively correlated to profitability margin and average tax rate.
Table-I Descriptive Statistics -Full Sample for the period of 1995-2006
I/K is capital expenditures scaled by lagged net PPE. SIZE1 is measured as ln(Sales). Q is ratio of market to book value of total assets. CF/K is (net income + DA) scaled by lagged net PPE. CF1/K is scaled EBITDA. OLR1 is rental expenses scaled by lagged K. OLR2 is rental commitments scaled by lagged K. Z is Altman's Z computed as 3.3× (Pretax Income/Total Assets) +1.0 × (Net Sales/Total Assets) + 1.4×(Retained Earnings/Total Assets) + 1.2×(Current Assets-Current Liabilities)/(Total Assets). EBITCOVER is the ratio of EBIT to Interest expense. PM is ratio of EBITDA to Sales. FAR is ratio of net PPE to total assets. AC is a dummy based on credit rating and is equal to 1 if rating is available else 0. ILLIQ is measured as the yearly average ratio of daily absolute return to the dollar trading volume on that day as per Amihud (2002) . BASPREAD is the yearly average of difference between daily closing bid and ask prices. Tax rate is the ratio of tax expense to pretax income. LTLCF is large tax loss carry forwards, a dummy equal to 1 if firm has a positive tax-loss-carry-forward exceeding current year EBITDA else 0. I/K is capital expenditures scaled by lagged net PPE. SIZE1 is measured as ln(Sales). Q is ratio of market to book value of total assets. CF/K is (net income + DA) scaled by lagged net PPE. CF1/K is scaled EBITDA. OLR1 is rental expenses scaled by lagged K. OLR2 is rental commitments scaled by lagged K. Z is Altman's Z computed as 3.3× (Pretax Income/Total Assets) +1.0 × (Net Sales/Total Assets) + 1.4×(Retained Earnings/Total Assets) + 1.2×(Current Assets-Current Liabilities)/(Total Assets). EBITCOVER is the ratio of EBIT to Interest expense. PM is ratio of EBITDA to Sales. FAR is ratio of net PPE to total assets. AC is a dummy based on credit rating and is equal to 1 if rating is available else 0. ILLIQ is measured as the yearly average ratio of daily absolute return to the dollar trading volume on that day as per Amihud (2002) . BASPREAD is the yearly average of difference between daily closing bid and ask prices. Tax rate is the ratio of tax expense to pretax income. LTLCF is large tax loss carry forwards, a dummy equal to 1 if firm has a positive tax-loss-carry-forward exceeding current year EBITDA else 0.
VARIABLE
(15-17) Construction . PM is ratio of EBITDA to Sales. FAR is ratio of net PPE to total assets. AC is a dummy based on credit rating and is equal to 1 if rating is available else 0. ILLIQ is measured as the yearly average ratio of daily absolute return to the dollar trading volume on that day as per Amihud (2002) . BASPREAD is the yearly average of difference between daily closing bid and ask prices. Tax rate is the ratio of tax expense to pretax income. LTLCF is large tax loss carry forwards, a dummy equal to 1 if firm has a positive tax-loss-carry-forward exceeding current year EBITDA else 0. P values are reported below the correlation coefficients. 
Table-IV
Regressions of Leasing Determinants
OLR1 is rental expenses scaled by lagged K. AC is a dummy based on credit rating and is equal to 1 if rating is available else 0. ILLIQ is measured as the yearly average ratio of daily absolute return to the dollar trading volume on that day as per Amihud (2002) . LTLCF is large tax loss carry forwards, a dummy equal to 1 if firm has a positive tax-loss-carry-forward exceeding current year EBITDA else 0. TAX RATE is the ratio of tax expense to pretax income. SIZE1 is measured as ln(Sales). Q is ratio of market to book value of total assets. FAR is ratio of net PPE to total assets. PM is ratio of EBITDA to Sales. BASPREAD is the yearly average of difference between daily closing bid and ask prices.
Absolute values of t-statistics reported in parentheses for significant coefficients. * significant at 10% , ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1% respectively. Absolute values of t-statistics reported in parentheses for significant coefficients. * significant at 10% , ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1% respectively. 
Model
Regression(s)
Table-VI Robustness Checks Investment-Cash Flow Regressions in Changes
I/K is capital expenditures scaled by lagged net PPE. Q is ratio of market to book value of total assets. CF/K is (net income + DA) scaled by lagged net PPE. OLR1 is rental expenses scaled by lagged K. OLR2 is rental commitments scaled by lagged K. SIZE1 is measured as ln(Sales). Z is Altman's Z computed as 3.3× (Pretax Income/Total Assets) +1.0 × (Net Sales/Total Assets) + 1.4× (Retained Earnings/Total Assets) + 1.2×(Current Assets-Current Liabilities)/(Total Assets).
Overall
Overall Absolute values of t-statistics reported in parentheses for significant coefficients. * significant at 10% , ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1% respectively.
Table-VII Robustness Checks Instrumental Variable Regressions of Investment-Cash Flow
I/K is capital expenditures scaled by lagged net PPE. Q is ratio of market to book value of total assets. CF/K is (net income + DA) scaled by lagged net PPE. OLR1 * is predicted rental expenses scaled by lagged K from first stage regressions. OLR1 * is predicted rental commitments scaled by lagged K from first stage regressions. SIZE1 is measured as ln(Sales). Z is Altman's Z computed as 3.3× (Pretax Income/Total Assets) +1.0 × (Net Sales/Total Assets) + 1.4×(Retained Earnings/Total Assets) + 1.2×(Current Assets-Current Liabilities)/(Total Assets). The estimation is by two step GMM and only the results of second stage are presented for brevity. The instruments used for OLR1/2 are FAR(fixed assets ratio) and LTLCF(Large Tax Loss Carry Forwards)
Model
Expected Absolute values of t-statistics reported in parentheses for significant coefficients. * significant at 10% , ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1% respectively.
Table-VIII Robustness Checks Simultaneous Equation model of Investment and Leasing
I/K is capital expenditures scaled by lagged net PPE. Q is ratio of market to book value of total assets. CF/K is (net income + DA) scaled by lagged net PPE. OLR1 * is predicted rental expenses scaled by lagged K from first stage regressions. SIZE1 is measured as ln(Sales). Z is Altman's Z computed as 3.3× (Pretax Income/Total Assets) +1.0 × (Net Sales/Total Assets) + 1.4×(Retained Earnings/Total Assets) + 1.2×(Current AssetsCurrent Liabilities)/(Total Assets). The estimation is by 3 stage least squares and only the results from last stage are presented for brevity. (I/K) * is predicted capital expenditures scaled by lagged net PPE from the first stage regressions. FAR is ratio of net PPE to total assets. AC is a dummy based on credit rating and is equal to 1 if rating is available else 0. ILLIQ is measured as the yearly average ratio of daily absolute return to the dollar trading volume on that day as per Amihud (2002) . Tax Rate is the ratio of tax expense to pretax income. LTLCF is large tax loss carry forwards, a dummy equal to 1 if firm has a positive tax-loss-carry-forward exceeding current year EBITDA else 0. PM is ratio of EBITDA to Sales. Absolute values of t-statistics reported in parentheses for significant coefficients. * significant at 10% , ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1% respectively.
Expected
Table-IX Robustness Checks Investment-Cash Flow Regressions for overall as well as High and Low Information Asymmetry firms
I/K is capital expenditures scaled by lagged net PPE. Q is ratio of market to book value of total assets. CF/K is (net income + DA) scaled by lagged net PPE. OLR1 is rental expenses scaled by lagged K. SIZE1 is measured as ln(Sales). Z is Altman's Z computed as 3.3× (Pretax Income/Total Assets) +1.0 × (Net Sales/Total Assets) + 1.4× (Retained Earnings/Total Assets) + 1.2× (Current Assets-Current Liabilities)/(Total Assets). Agency Cost(AC) is a dummy based on credit rating and is equal to 1 if rating is available else 0. ILLIQ is measured as the yearly average ratio of daily absolute return to the dollar trading volume on that day as per Amihud (2002) . Quintile-1 represents low information asymmetry firms and Quintile-5 represents high information asymmetry firms. 
Expected
